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UNCANNY LESSONS
AESTHETIC CONDITIONS IN THE WORK 
OF MARKUS SCHINWALD
I
A spectacle focuses all of the available attention on itself.1 It directs the gaze towards the 
stage, the Greco-Latin scaena, at the same time as turning it away from reality. Whatever 
lies beyond the stage, show, or spectacle is ‘obscene’ in the true sense of the word, the 
Latin ob scaenam, the everyday, unspectacular, non-staged, the ordinary and familiar.2 
Markus Schinwald’s sitcoms integrate this element of the everyday and ordinary, the over­
looked or scorned. The unspectacular outside becomes the inside of the spectacle.3
Media dislocation, mirroring and reflection takes place on very different levels within 
Schinwald’s work. For the viewer or spectator, they create an irritating, unsettling, some­
times even eerie impression. This feeling of irritation or wonder is the starting point for 
every aesthetic experience: “When the first encounter with some object surprises us, and 
we judge it to be new, or very different from what we knew in the past or what we sup­
posed it was going to be, this makes us wonder and be astonished at it. And since this can 
happen before we know in the least whether this object is suitable to us or not, it seems 
to me that wonder is the first of all the passions.”4
Astonishment, wonder, and irritation are not only the root of all the passions, but 
also the beginning of all philosophical thought and aesthetic experience. The question 
thus arises as to who is refracted, where and how, in the shifts and reflections of the media 
apparatus that Schinwald constructs for the viewer.5 The answer depends to a large degree 
on the position of the viewer in any given case. It is therefore always necessary to ask who 
is observing, who is observed, and from what position.
It is also necessary to distinguish between the different situations in which a par­
ticular viewer might encounter Schinwald’s works: as a member of a live audience during 
the production of the sitcom, watching from a kind of meta-level while the artist, camera 
crews, and actors repeat the various scenes until the director considers them finished; or, 
at the same time, watching the images delivered by the cameras, the live-edited video ver­
sion on the three flat screens. The live audience, then, can distinguish between the actors 
actually performing on the stage set and the reproduction of the media gaze on the screens. 
The viewer can apprehend this difference as an aesthetic insight concerning the reality of 
television/video recording, processing this knowledge in emotional, cognitive, and social 
terms. As an eye witness present at the production of a sitcom, then, the viewer is a com­
ponent of a presented and staged situation in which all objects, persons, and events are 
actually completely present, performing on the stage set created by Schinwald. The viewer 
is an eye witness to a staged spectacle that is performed in his/her presence. At the same 
time, audience members can watch the video recordings on the flat screens mounted on
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the ceiling at the front edge of the stage, comparing these images with their own experi- 
ence of the performance situation. They can compare their subjective view with the media 
view of the cameras and the edited version, integrating this view into their own experience 
or consciously distinguishing between the two.
Visitors to the exhibition, on the other hand, are neither eye witnesses nor parti­
cipants in the performance. They see the real stage with the real set and props, and they 
can walk on this stage. But the stage is empty, with no actors performing, no cameras 
moving back and forth, no director shouting “action” or “cut”. Instead, the visitor sees the 
edited recording of the performance on the flat screens. He sees an audiovisual moving 
image that is to a certain extent at odds with the present reality.6 As such, the exhibition 
visitor’s aesthetic insights cannot draw on the decisive distinction made by the live audi­
ence between its own perspective and that of the video recording. While the live audience 
member is a second-order observer who can watch others watching, the exhibition visitor
remains an observer of the first order: he 
sees what he sees.
One thing the exhibition visitor 
can do, however, is apply his powers of 
imagination. The empty stage with its 
props remains an empty space for the 
imagination.7 At the same time, the 
images on the screens show that the actors 
on the stage must have performed in a 
particular way. This allows visitors to the 
exhibition to project an imagined aes­
thetic experience back onto the real stage, 
mentally reinserting the missing actors 
and audience into the spatial and tem­
poral setting. II
II
The spectator sees everything. At least he 
thinks he does. In fact, however, he only 
sees what he is shown by the invisible 
powers that produce the spectacle. As the 
audience, we are always already complicit 
with the spectacle: fascinated, shocked, 
excited, frustrated.
The actors are real people who 
perform in front of real spectators in the 
three-dimensional space of the produc­
tion. But—and this is where the first shift, 
the first break with reality begins—they 
do not perform as themselves, instead rep­
resenting someone else, a fictional char­
acter embodied in their part. They are 
themselves in physical terms, at the same 
time as playing a different, imaginary per-
1) “As a part of society, [the spectacle] is the focal 
point of all vision and all consciousness.” Guy Debord, 
The Society of The Spectacle, trans. Ken Knabb, Lon­
don, 2006, p. 7.
2) Johannes David Schreber, De libris obscoenis, 
Lipsiae: Fleischer 1688, § 2.
3) “When the real world is transformed into mere 
images, mere images become real things - dynamic fig­
ments that provide the direct motivations for a hypnotic 
behavior. Since the spectacles job is to use various spe­
cialized mediations in order to show us a world that can 
no longer be directly grasped, it naturally elevates the 
sense of sight to the special pre-eminence once occu­
pied by touch ...” Debord, op. cit. (note 1), p. 11.
4) Rene Descartes, The Passions of 'The Soul (1649), 
trans. S. H. Voss, Indianapolis, 1989, Article 53, p. 52.
5) Gilles Deleuze, “What is a dispositifi,” in Arm­
strong, Michel Foucault, Philosopher, trans. and ed. Tim­
othy J. Armstrong, New York, 1992, pp. 159—168.
6) “The image object, however, is given in a per­
ceptual apprehension modified by the characteristic of 
imagination. But that still does not suffice. The appear­
ance belonging to the image object is distinguished in 
one point from the normal perceptual appearance. This 
is an essential point that makes it impossible for us to 
view the appearance belonging to the image object as a 
normal perception: It bears within itself the character­
istic of unreality, of conflict with the actual present 
Edmund Husserl, Fantasy, Image Consciousness, and 
Memory (1898-1925), (= Husserliana, Vol. XXIII), Den 
Haag, Boston, London, 2006, § 22, p. 51.
7) For more detail on this, Cf. Hans Dieter Huber, 
Bild, Beobachter, Milieu. Entwurf einer allgemeinen Bild- 
wissenschaft, Ostfildern-Ruit, 2004, pp. 81-88.
8) “The human individual has a body that he can 
manipulate and exploit like other objects. At the same 
time, he is this body, he is a body-subject. By stepping 
outside of himself to portray a character ‘in the mate­
rial of his own existence,’ he points emphatically to 
duplication and the implied distance.” Erika Fischer- 
Lichte, Asthetik des Performativen, Frankfurt am Main, 
2005, p. 129. (all excerpts herein trans. NG)
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son. They are an embodied fiction.8 The spectator is caught in this duality of simply- 
being and pretending-to-be. Sometimes he sees the fictitious character as portrayed and 
embodied by the actor, other times he sees the actor himself, the real person. And at such 
moments, he sees the actor as himself, as the person he really is and as none other. When 
the director stops the scene and the actors return to their starting positions, maybe mak­
ing jokes among themselves which are not recorded, then at such moments, the actor is 
not an actor. Rather than embodying a part, he is the person who he is. The actor, then, 
is a dual being, himself and not himself. He is an uncanny revenant of the self.9
The exhibition visitor, on the other hand, who can only see the video recordings, 
no longer has this possibility of experiencing a dual physicality. He cannot tell that what 
he sees is just an act and that the actors also have a reality, a life, and a body of their own. 
Whereas the live spectator can switch constantly back and forth within his aesthetic expe­
rience between the level of performance/embodiment and that of actor/body. This enables 
him to observe the constitutive conditions of the film construction and make them part 
of his aesthetic experience.
Let us now go back one step further. The scene itself, the built architecture, is also 
not really itself. It is a stage set, a backdrop. It, too, represents something different, some­
thing absent, embodying it via its physical materiality. The stage set, too, is a doppel- 
ganger. On the one hand, it is itself, real, made of wood and paint. On the other hand, it 
is not itself, referring instead to a different space which is absent and which it only repre­
sents. The stage set points to something that is not present, to a fictional space. This ref­
erential character of the scene, and thus its ambivalence, can also be identified by the 
exhibition visitor, as he can walk round the set and see its “ob-scene” reverse, its outside.
Ill
Sitcom (short for situation comedy) is a distinct television genre with its roots in the 
American radio comedy shows of the 1930s and ‘40s. The genre is clearly linked to the 
medium of television.10 The television series “I Love Lucy” with the actors Lucille Ball 
and Desi Arnaz is considered the first major sitcom hit of the early 1950s. The series was 
pre-produced for television in front of a studio audience and broadcast at a later date. It 
was shot using three 35mm movie cameras and without using canned laughter. The 
laughing of the live audience supported the liveliness of the performance and gave the 
end result an authentic, acoustic accompaniment.11 The use of three cameras offered 
the opportunity to film not just the per­
son speaking but also the reactions of the 
other actors, thus capturing unexpectedly 
funny moments.12 The three-camera 
technique was retained as standard for the 
production of sitcoms. At this point, 
however, the footage was still being shot 
on film stock that had to be developed 
before editing could take place. This gave 
series like “I Love Lucy” a special cine­
matographic quality. Then, in the sec­
ond half of the 1950s, with the inven­
tion of magnetic tape recording by 
Ampex, combined with electronic stu-
9) From the 1960s, theater productions and per­
formance art tested and developed ways of using the 
body by “consistendy departing from the assumption 
of the duality of body-being and body-having, of the 
phenomenal body and the semiotic body. Uses of the 
body are founded in and justified by the bodily being- 
in-the-world of the actor/performer.” Fischer-Lichte, 
op. cit. (note 8), p. 139.
10) Daniela Holzer, Die deutsche Sitcom. Format. 
Konzeption, Drehbuch, Umsetzung, Bergisch Gladbach 
1999, p. 39. Cf. also Jurgen Wolff, Sitcom. Ein Hatid- 
buch fur Autoren. Tricks, Tipps und Techniken des Com­
edy-Genres, Cologne, 1997.
11) Holzer, op. cit. (note 10), p. 15.
12) Holzer, op. cit. (note 10), p. 45.
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dio cameras, so-called “live recording” became possible.13 This meant that images from 
the individual cameras could be edited while the actors were performing live in front of 
the studio audience based on the monitor images from the three cameras. This is the tech­
nique used by Markus Schinwald in Vanishing Lessons.
Characteristic of sitcoms is their swift succession of gags, punch lines, and 
comical situations. Unlike comedy shows, however, where sketches are simply performed 
one after the other, these elements are embedded in a plot, a narrative. Classic sitcoms are 
typically fdmed in a studio on a simple stage set which, as in the case of Schinwald’s 
Exceptions Prove the Rule (2007), may also contain outdoor spaces like the front door 
with the garbage can. Sitcom episodes usually take the form of a half-hour television 
format.14
It should be stated clearly and unequivocally, however, that Vanishing Lessons is 
not a classic television sitcom but a performative installation. The videos are not broad­
cast on television, but shown in an art exhibition. It is a matter of the specific difference, 
then, the conflict with the actual present of television, as Husserl would put it. Schinwald 
does of course borrow many elements of sitcoms, like the set-like stage, working with a 
director, television cameras, actors, and live audience. But he also makes key changes to 
the format. The stage is no longer purely a set, tending instead to varying degrees in the 
direction of a sculpture or an installation. Several unexpected changes or surprises are 
built into parts of the set and the furnishings, for example, like an over-long drawer that 
can be pulled almost three meters out of the chest of drawers, or a narrow secret passage 
between the walls of two rooms which allows the actors to enter and leave the stage via a 
double cupboard.
IV
Every staged event also stands in relation to an outside, however, something it is not. This 
outside is the only thing about such an event that is not staged. One might refer to it as 
the ob-scene, that which is located outside the scene or stage. But is it the outside of the 
spectacle that elicits the astonishment, shock, or wonder of the viewer? In any case, it is a 
place where the media shifts and refractions of reality become visible and thus apprehen­
sible as such. In this light, one can use the word obscene to describe spectacular events 
that possess an outside that is made accessible to the viewer. The effect is one of dis-illu- 
sionment, an annulling of the illusion of the spectacle.15
When this occurs, what is portrayed is experienced as a portrayal, what is staged 
as a scene, what is acted as an act. The apparatus of the stage becomes transparent, some­
thing one can look behind, and thus relative. For the spectator, this is a moment of dis­
illusionment, the abolition of illusion. Dis-illusionment is an important subjective expe­
rience, something that can only be experienced in and with relation to oneself. For this
reason, the realization that the spectacle
13) Albert Abramson, The History of Television, 
1942-2000, Jefferson, 2002, p. 60 ff.
14) Holzer, op. cit. (note 10), p. 13.
13) “Considered in its own terms, the spectacle is 
an affirmation of appearances and an identification of 
all human social life with appearances. But a critique 
that grasps the spectacles essential character reveals it 
to be a visible negation of life—a negation that has taken 
on visible form." Debord, op. cit. (note 1), p. 9.
is just staged, the play just a play, the act 
just an act has healing and cathartic prop­
erties. It promotes a sense of being 
anchored in a reality which the spectacle 
originally shifted into illusion and 
reflected via the media. Now, this spec­
tacular shift, the media break with the 
real, is reversed in the disappointment and
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in the surprise at oneself. A memento mori says: Watch out! It’s not the way you think or 
believe. In reality, it’s quite different.
As a third level of the media reflection of apparent reality, the film cameras, cam­
eramen, director, cable carriers, technicians, assistants, and so forth come into play. This 
level can be described as the media apparatus of film recording.16 This media apparatus 
surrounds the stage, the actors, and the spectators in equal measure. As a significant frame 
round the spectacle, it represents the condition for the possibility of representation. It is 
the invisible outside of the recording.
The director, hidden from the audience, operates as an all-seeing, panoptic god. 
Like the spectator, he believes he can see everything. In reality, however, he possesses just 
three monocular technical eyes which he can control and direct via radio instructions: the 
live images from the three cameras. The cameras are technical prostheses of seeing which 
seem to extend the borders of his perceptive capacity, but which actually limit, discipline, 
and restrict this capacity in a way that has far-reaching consequences. The director is him­
self part of the media apparatus, by which—in freely submitting to its conditions—he is 
cast, generated, and brought forth as a “seeing subject.” The director as a panoptic god is 
in reality a subject shaped, subjugated, and disciplined by the media apparatus.17 He sees 
only the flat, two-dimensional images recorded in real time by the cameras. He decides 
which camera shot is used at any given time and when to switch to the picture from a dif­
ferent camera. He is connected to the camera crew by a headset and can invisibly control 
them at any time. At the same time, he can send instructions to the actors, especially 
when a scene is to be shot again or when a mistake has been made. His voice is like the 
voice of an all-seeing, omniscient god. The directors instructions have something decid­
edly uncanny about them. It seems as if he has control over everything. In reality, his view 
is the most strongly limited and the most artificial of all those involved, as his perceptions 
depend on just three two-dimensional moving images plus sound.
V
Members of the audience at the live 
recording, by contrast, occupy an entirely 
different perceptive position. They sit on 
a stepped podium, offering the best pos­
sible view. They see all levels of the pro­
duction at the same time and can switch 
their attention back and forth between 
them at will. In addition to the real per­
formance of the actors on stage, they— 
and only they—can also follow a two- 
dimensional representation of the action 
on several flat screens in real time.
The spectator, then, is able to dif­
ferentiate between at least three different 
levels. First, the set-like stage construc­
tion and the actions of the actors in it. 
Second, the media apparatus of film 
recording, which lies like a seemingly 
invisible, panoptic surveillance organ over
16) “What 1 am trying to pick out with this term 
is, firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble con­
sisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, 
regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, sci­
entific statements, philosophical, moral and philan­
thropic propositions—in short, the said as much as the 
unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus. The 
apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be 
established between these elements.” Michel Foucault, 
Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 
1972-1977; New York, 1980, p. 194.
Cf. also: “These apparatuses, then, are composed 
of the following elements: lines of visibility and enun­
ciation, lines of force, lines of subjectification, lines of 
splitting, breakage, fracture, all of which criss-cross and 
mingle together, some lines reproducing and giving rise 
to others, by means of variations or even changes in the 
way they are grouped.” Deleuze, op. cit. (note 1).
17) Michel Foucault, The Order of Discourse, trans. 
Ian McLeod, in Robert Young (ed.), Untying the Text, 
Boston, 1981, pp. 48-78.
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the entire production situation. The two cameras installed in front of each stage set in the 
exhibition give a potential indication of this level which is concealed but which can be 
observed, identified, and revealed as such by the spectator. The media apparatus of the 
recording decides what will be shown to the exhibition visitors and what is kept from 
them, what is made to disappear as the latent, obscured outside of the film recording. And 
third, the recording itself as a two-dimensional moving image. It is shown on three flat 
screens, attaining a visual autonomy of its own with respect to the other levels of repre­
sentation and media. Finally, it is the image level that survives for the future as a visual 
representation of an absent and past event in the form of a work.
In view of the multiple media dislocations within the stage situation, this produc­
tion begins to resemble post-dramatic theater.18 In recent years, such media dislocations 
and reflections have often taken place in this field, for example in the plays of Rene Pollesch 
or in Nicolas Stemann’s 2006 production of Elfriede Jelinek’s “Ulrike Maria Stuart” at the 
Thalia Theater in Hamburg.
The audience itself remains the blind spot of the whole observation set-up. The 
spectator constitutes his own latency. In order to observe, to distinguish and name, he 
must remain obscured as the instance that makes decisions. This blind spot, the structure 
of auto-latency and self-invisibility, is reflected on the third floor of the exhibition at 
Kunsthaus Bregenz. Attached to a grey, abstract architectural framework, various mirrors 
give a view of the whole media apparatus. In the form of a re-entry19 of the excluded into 
the exclusion zone, the outside of observation, audience and cameras is introduced into 
the inside of representation. Now the cameras suddenly become visible. The spectators, 
invisible until this point as the blind spot of observation, can now experience themselves 
as a social group of eye witnesses.20 They see themselves reflected in the mirrors, repre­
sented in the video, and experience themselves as eye witnesses while they watch the per­
formance.
“In the scopic field, the gaze is outside, I am looked at, that is to say, I am a pic­
ture. ... What determines me, at the most profound level, in the visible, is the gaze that 
is outside. It is through the gaze that I enter light and it is from the gaze that I receive its 
effects.”21
Via the mirrors, the excluded outsides of the production are brought back into the 
production. That which is off stage (the obscenity of the real) now becomes a part of the 
staged spectacle. This creates a fourth level of media reflection and dislocation of reality. 
Where has the outside disappeared to? It enters the work itself as form, becoming
visible as reflection. For before one sees
18) “The adjective ‘post-dramatic’ refers to a kind 
of theater that feels obliged to operate beyond drama, 
in a time ‘after’ the validity of the paradigm of drama 
in the theater.” Jens-Thies Lehmann, Postdramatisches 
Theater, Frankfurt am Main, 1999, p. 30 (trans NG).
19) On the concept of re-entry, cf. George Spencer- 
Brown, Laws of Form, New York, 1979, pp. 69-76.
20) Cf. Hans Dieter Huber, “Split Attention. 
Performance und Publikum bei Dan Graham,” in: 
Huber, Dan Graham. Interviews, Ostfildern-Ruit, 1997, 
pp. 47-63.
21) Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Con­
cepts of Psychoanalysis. Seminar XI, New York, 1981,
p. 106.
22) “I see only from pone point, but in my exis­
tence I am looked at from all sides.” Lacan, op. cit. 
(note 21), p. 72.
from a specific point oneself, one is long 
since being viewed from all round, 
according to a well-known formulation 
by Jacques Lacan.22 Like in a conjurors 
trick, the outside of the spectacle seems 
to have dissolved and become a specta­
cle itself. Everything is now spectacle, 
everything is staged. There seems to be no 
more outside world, no blind spot, no 
unobserved latency, no invisible fields. 
Everything is panoptic presence. A truly 
uncanny situation has been created. Here, 
faced with his reflection it the mirror, 
when the spectator himself enters into the
— 102
form of the spectacle as a blind spot, a switching of attention takes place. Attention becomes 
self-attention, aesthetic experience becomes self-experience, reference becomes self-refer­
ence.
1 his peripatetic transfer of experience onto itself, the transformation of experience 
into self-experience, is the key to understanding Markus Schinwald’s work. Everything 
points back to us. At this moment of transfer triggered by the reflection in the mirror, it 
becomes clear that every experience is ultimately self-experience. Attention is always directed 
either towards ourselves or towards the other, but never towards both at the same time. 
Every reference presupposes self-reference. As a result of this self-recognition in the mir­
ror image, it becomes clear that self-experience, self-attention, and self-reference represent 
the fundamental conditions for the possibility of experience, attention, and reference. With­
out the ability to distinguish between oneself and the other, and to draw a line between 
the two, no observation or experience are possible.
Every possible relationship to the world that a human individual can adopt is thus 
characterized by two fundamental and inseparable aspects that form two sides of one and 
the same distinction. In any given case, one must be rendered invisible, blocked out, and 
kept in a latent state in favor of the other in order to set in motion the operation of obser­
vation. Either experience and attention are directed outwards at the world and the other, 
i.e., that which is observed, or they are directed towards the self, inwards, towards the per­
son doing the observing. But observation can never be directed towards both at the same 
time. Aesthetic experience as a special form of observation oscillates back and forth between 
aspects of the self and aspects of the world, the spectacle, the media apparatus, and the 
mechanisms of discipline.
The return of the repressed, described by Sigmund Freud as one of the causes of 
the feeling of the uncanny,23 can now be described as the re-entry of the blind spot, of 
excluded latency, and of the invisibility of one’s own self into conscious observation, expe­
rience, or attention. It leads the self-recognizing spectator or exhibition visitor to realize 
within aesthetic experience that he must ultimately take responsibility for his own dis­
tinctions by recognizing and above all by acknowledging that it really is he himself who is 
making them. And this means taking responsibility for his own feelings, projections, asso­
ciations, aesthetic likes and dislikes.
This places Markus Schinwald as an artist in the tradition of the educators and social 
reformers of the eighteenth century. His work is a great and uncanny lesson about the role 
of the viewer and his social responsibility for the construction of assigned roles. The 
viewers subjugation by the media apparatuses of discipline and self-correction and his res­
urrection, his re-entry into the spectacle of society as a social, purified, disciplined, edu­
cated, and subjugated subject via aesthetic 
23) Sigmund Freud, “The Uncanny” (1919) in experience, can be perceived in Schin- 
Freud, The Uncanny, New York, 2003, p. 121 fif. wald’s works as an experience of freedom.
— 103 —
